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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Easley argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
her due process and equal protection when it denied her Motion to Augment the record 
on appeal with transcripts of the admit/deny hearing, held on September 17, 2007, the 
disposition hearing, held on October 29, 2007, and the rider review hearing, held on 
February 22, 2011. Ms. Easley argues that the requested transcripts are necessary for 
her appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the prior 
proceedings when it executed her sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction. Based on 
the new standard of review articulated in State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 
2012), the State argues that the transcripts at are issue are not relevant because the 
district court never referenced those proceedings when it revoked probation and 
executed Ms. Easley's sentence. 
Ms. Easley argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because a district 
court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it makes a sentencing 
decision. In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals presumes that a district court will rely on 
its own memory of the prior proceedings when making a sentencing determination after 
a period of probation. Based on that presumption, the Idaho' Court of Appeals has held 
that it reviews the entire record before the district court, which includes events which 
occurred before and after sentencing. It follows that transcripts of the requested 
hearing are necessary in order for an Idaho appellate court to conduct this review. 
Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an independent review of the entire record when 
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determining whether a district court abused its discretion in regard to a sentencing 
determination, what was specifically presented to the district court at the probation 
violation disposition hearing does not define the scope of review concerning the 
sentencing issue. The only questions are: whether the information at issue was before 
the district court at any of the prior hearings, and whether that information is relevant to 
the sentencing issues on appeal. 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Easley also argued that the Twin Falls County 
practice which affords the prosecuting attorney the ability to veto a defendant's 
application to mental health court violates the separation of powers doctrine contained 
in Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. Ms. Easley specifically argues that the 
decision to place her in the mental health court program occurred after the entry of 
judgment and, therefore, constitutes a probationary decision which is inherently judicial 
in nature and that decision is statutorily delegated to the district court pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2601. In response, the State cites to cases from Oregon and Washington which 
deal with a prosecutor's ability to control admission into drug courts before the entry of 
judgment. The cases relied on by the State do not address Ms. Easley's arguments. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Easley's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Easley due process and equal protection 
when it denied her Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent 
a district court from considering the placement of a defendant into mental health 
court violate Idaho's separation of powers doctrine? 
3. Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the prosecutor to prevent 
a district court from considering a defendant as a candidate for mental health 
court violate the constitutional requirement that all courts of the same class have 
uniform judicial powers, procedures, and practices? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Easley's 
probation?1 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further reduce 
Ms. Easley's sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation? 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Easley Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making 
sentencing decisions. Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho 
appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive 
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record 
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in 
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally 
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered. Instead, the 
central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing 
determination. 
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was 
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing 
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of 
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of 
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which 
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of 
the issue on appeal. 
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B. The New Standard Of Review Articulated in Morgan Is Inapposite As It Did Not 
Alter The Standard Of Review Applicable When An Appellant Challenges The 
Length Of A Sentence Which Is Executed After The Revocation Of Probation 
In reliance on the new standard of review articulated in Morgan, the State argues 
that the requested transcripts are not necessary for this appeal. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.5-9.) Contrary to the State's position, the Morgan standard of review is only 
applicable to the question of whether probation should be revoked, not to the question 
of what is an appropriate sentence. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009), 
made it clear what standard of review is applicable when the question on appeal is 
whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion. Morgan is inapposite, as 
Ms. Easley is challenging the length of her sentence on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals' standard of review which is relevant to the length of a 
sentence which is executed following the revocation of probation was articulated in 
Hanington. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about 
the proper standard of review in probation revocation cases. Id. at 27. Relying on 
State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 
392 (Ct. App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen 
between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any 
need for appellate courts to review the change of plea hearing transcript, the sentencing 
transcript, and the presentence report because all of that information would have been 
available to the district court prior to the original sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington 
argued that the proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing 
both at the time of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into 
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execution," relying on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 
1055-"1056 (Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and 
held: 
Id. 
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review 
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited 
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and 
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we 
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation. 
The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to 
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the 
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal. 
The rationale behind this clarification comports with the rationale in the holding from 
State v. Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the 
entire record when reviewing the executed sentence: 
[Wlhen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and post judgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
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hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56 (emphasis added). As such, when an appellant 
challenges the length of his/her sentence, the applicable standard of review requires an 
independent and comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well 
as the events which occurred during, the disposition of the matter at issue. The basis 
for this standard of review is that the judge "naturally and quite properly remembers the 
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. 
Based on that presumption, the Court of Appeals held that, "When reviewing that 
decision, we should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold 
that the district court must expressly reference the prejudgment events in order for this 
standard of review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals 
presumed the judge will automatically consider the prejudgment events when 
determining whether to execute or reduce a sentence. 
Additionally, the State implicitly asserts that Ms. Easley should file a renewed 
motion to augment the record with the Court of Appeals in the event this case is 
assigned to the Court of Appeals. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) This assertion is 
without merit because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed with the 
Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall be 
no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
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other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.A.R. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Ms. Easley is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to an 
appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. "Idaho Appellate Rule 110 
expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the State's contention that Ms. Easley could 
file a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to the 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
In sum, the Morgan Opinion is inapposite as it only dealt with an appeal 
challenging the district court's decision to revoke probation. Hanington still controls the 
applicable standard of review when a sentence is challenged on appeal. As such, the 
requested transcripts are relevant to the sentencing issue raised on appeal because 
Idaho Appellate Courts will presume that the district court relied on its memory of the 
prior proceedings when it executed Ms. Easley's sentence. As such, the district court 
need not have referenced the prior proceedings in order for the transcripts of those 
proceedings to be deemed relevant to Ms. Easley's sentencing issue. 
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II. 
The Fifth Judicial District's Practice, Which Allows The Prosecutor To Prevent The 
District Court From Considering A Defendant As A Candidate For Mental Health Court, 
Violates Idaho's Separation Of Powers Doctrine 
Ms. Easley's separation of powers argument hinges on the fact that her request 
for admittance into mental health court was made after the entry of judgment. In her 
Appellant's Brief, and in reliance on Bil/is v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990), 
Ms. Easley drew the distinction between the prosecutor's pre-judgment executive 
decision to pursue or dismiss charges and a district court's judicial post-judgment 
decision to set the terms of probation. In response to this argument, the State primarily 
relies on two cases-both of which address only the prosecutor's pre-judgment executive 
decision to pursue or dismiss charges. (Respondent's Brief, pp12-13.) Those cases, 
deal with drug court programs which stop the criminal proceedings prior to the entry of 
judgment and, in the event if the defendant complies with treatment, the criminal cases 
are dismissed. As such, the State's cases do not address Ms. Easley's argument on 
appeal. 
The State initially relies on State v. Graves, 648 P.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1982), for the 
proposition that "the power to decide whether to divert a defendant for drug treatment is 
no more intrusive on the judicial branch than the power to decide whether to take any 
action against the defendant at all .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The Graves 
Opinion is inapposite as that case was dealing with a pre-judgment diversionary 
program governed by the following statute: 
When the results of the evaluation obtained under ORS 430.460 or 
430.465 indicate that the defendant is a drug-dependent person within the 
meaning of ORS 430.450 to 430.555, and the results of the evaluation 
indicate that such person may benefit in a substantial manner from 
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treatment for drug dependence, the prosecutor, with the concurrence of 
the court, may direct the defendant to receive treatment as a contingent 
alternative to prosecution. If defendant refuses treatment, criminal 
proceedings shall be resumed. 
O.R.S. 430.485. Oregon's Revised Statute 430.485 enables a diversionary program 
that allows a defendant to avoid prosecution if s/he qualifies for the program and both 
the prosecutor and the court agree as to that outcome. In the event the defendant is 
successful in the program, the charges are then dismissed by the prosecutor. In the 
event the defendant refuses treatment, then the "criminal proceedings shall be 
resumed." This is an example of a diversionary program where the prosecuting 
attorney is exercising the executive power of determining which cases should be 
brought to trial. The Graves Opinion provides no guidance in this case because it dealt 
with a pre-judgment diversionary program, not a post-judgment sentencing alternative. 
The second case relied on by the State is State v. Diluzo, 90 P.3d 1141 (Ct. App. 
2004). The State relies on this case for the proposition that "the practice of allowing the 
prosecutor to make the initial determinations of drug court eligibility [is not] an 
unconstitutional delegation of power to the prosecutor" because the prosecutor is in a 
better position to asses a defendant's eligibility for such a program. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.12-13.) 
Neither the Diluzo Opinion nor the applicable statute authorizing the creation of 
drug courts in Washington State, R.C.W. 2.28.170, indicate whether drug court 
participation occurs before or after sentencing. However, in ruling on the separation of 
powers argument in that case, the third division of the Washington Court of Appeals 
noted that the Supreme Court of Washington had previously rejected a prosecutorial 
veto power in the context of the State's "deferred prosecution" sentencing alternative 
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because judges in Washington control "traditional choices of imprisonment, fine, and 
post-conviction probation." Id. at 1145. It appears that the Diluzo Court was dealing 
with a pre-judgment drug court program. Moreover, Diluzo supports Ms. Easley's 
position that the ability to determine the terms of probation is traditionally a judicial 
decision. 
Additionally, it appears from other Washington cases that the Washington drug 
court program is ordered prior to the entry of judgment. For example, in State v. Drum, 
225 P.3d 237, 239 (2010), the defendant was required to enter a contract to participate 
in drug court. One of the terms of that contract allowed the defendant to withdraw from 
the program and "the defendant will assume prosecution under the pending charge(s) 
as if the contract had never been agreed to." Id. The contract also stated that in the 
event the defendant was terminated form drug court the "defendant further agrees and 
stipulates that the facts presented [in the drug court contract] are sufficient to find the 
defendant guilty of the pending charge(s)." Id. (original emphasis). As such, the 
reasonable inference which can be drawn from the Drum case is that the drug court 
program in Washington is a pre-judgment program. It follows that any arguments based 
on the Washington drug court program do not address Ms. Easley's appellate claim. 
As a final note, the State relies on cases from Oklahoma and Louisiana for 
further support of its argument. However, the Oklahoma case, Woodard v. Morrissey, 
991 P.2d 1042 (Ok. App. 1999), dealt with a pre-sentencing drug court program and no 
separation of powers violation was found because it was part of the plea negotiations. 
Moreover, Oklahoma has a specific statute, Okla. Stat. 22 § 471.8, which governors the 
use of drug courts in the context of their use as a term of probation. That statute was 
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not analyzed in the Woodard Opinion. In the Louisiana case, State v. Taylor, 769 SO.2d 
535 (La. 2000), the Supreme Court of Louisiana did not decide the issue of a 
prosecutorial control over admission into a drug court on the basis of separation of 
powers. Instead, it merely concluded that the applicable Louisiana statute provided for 
prosecutorial control over admission into a drug court program. However, there were 
two dissenting opinions, one of which dissented partially on the basis of a separation of 
powers violation. Id. at 540-543. There was also a concurring opinion which noted that 
the statue at issue did not violate the State's separation powers doctrine because it 
dealt with the "pre-trial initiation of the eligibility process (at which time the district 
attorney can still reduce or dismiss the charge) [which is] a prosecutorial function." Id. 
at 539. The concurrence also concluded that the statute in the Tay/or case is "vastly" 
different from a statute deemed to violate the State's separation of powers doctrine in a 
prior opinion,2 because the unconstitutional statue "involved a post-conviction 
sentencing procedure, a function reserved exclusively to the judicial branch." Id. at 539-
540. 
In sum, Ms. Easley argues that in Idaho the decision to allow her to participate in 
a mental health court as a term of her probation was inherently judicial, and was 
statutorily delegated to the district court pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601. The State does not 
address Ms. Easley's statutory argument and, instead, relies on out of state cases 
which do not directly address the distinction between pre-judgment and post-judgment 
sentencing alternatives. 
2 See State v. LeCompte, 406 SO.2d 1300 (La.1981). 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Easley respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Easley respectfully 
requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions to consider placement into 
the Fifth Judicial District's mental health court. Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully 
requests that this Court remand this case with instructions to place her on probation. 
Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the 
indeterminate portion of her sentences. Alternatively, Ms. Easley respectfully requests 
that this Court reduce the length of her sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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